Outstanding book. I will need to blog this one in parts and pieces. Not sure if it is one that I wish to own yet, but I have thoroughly enjoyed reading it the last day or two.
From page 96, regarding Napoleon at Jena,
Thus Napoleon at Jena had known nothing about the main action that took place on that day; had forgotten all about two of his corps; did not issue orders to a third, and possibly a fourth; was taken by surprise by the the action of a fifth; and, to cap it all, had one of his principle subordinates display the kind of disobedience that would have brought a lesser mortal before a firing squad. Despite all these faults in command, Napoleon won what was probably the great single triumph in his career.
The book is about command through the ages and how the span of control (modern term) has changed the nature of the commander and the commanded's relationship on the battlefield.
Lesson learned from ch 3 -- Napoleon as a strategist reached a new level in that he "no longer attempted to keep the bulk of his forces concentrated under his own hand." (pages 96-97) What makes this possible? Van Creveld asserts that this decentralisation in command came about because of a number of innovations in the staffing of his armies. Not to mention that his commanders felt, more or less, at ease with operating with a commander's intent and some ambiguity. (page 97)
The question becomes what enabled this new way of warfare to be so successful. Van Creveld attempts to answer this in the person of Napoleon's genius, the large span of control (eight corps reporting directly to the Emperor, through Berthier) and the speed and decisiveness that all of this helped make possible. (pages 98-99)
Very interesting study.
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